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Congressional Investigations and Individual Rights
Much has been written and many cases reported discussing the status of
witnesses before Congressional investigating committees.' Most of the recent dis-
cussion on this subject seems to accept as an established principle of Constitutional
Law the premise that the only limitation on the power of the Congress to conduct
such investigations is to be found in the limitations imposed on the federal govern-
ment by the Constitution.2 And further, that the power of the federal courts to
interfere in these activities of the legislative branch is severely limited by the
doctrine of "separation of powers".3 This view is fortified by the specific grant to the
Congress by the Constitution of the power to "determine the rules of its own pro-
ceedings".4 The remedy for abuses of discretion has been held to lie with the
Congress, or ultimately with the people at the polls.5
Nevertheless, the courts are not powerless to set standards for the treatment
of witnesses. The federal courts and especially the Supreme Court, under the same
doctrine of "separation of powers", have as one of their primary functions the duty
of safeguarding individual rights, particularly, but not exclusively, 6 those set forth
in the Bill of Rights to the Constitution.7 Whenever the courts allow these rights
of the citizens to be abrogated without justification, whether by the legislature, the
executive, or others, on the ground that the doctrine of "separation of powers"
forbids them to interfere, they mistake their function and shirk their duty under the
Constitution.
This is particularly important in the case of witnesses before Congressional
investigation committees. The Congress generally resorts to judicial process to cite
witnesses for contempt pursuant to Title 2, U. S. Code §192 (1946) ,8 in lieu of
exercising its inherent, but limited, 9 contempt power. To exercise this inherent
power it is necessary to call the contumacious witness before the bar of either
House of Congress, and to remand him to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms by
way of punishment. Where the Congress resorts to the machinery of the courts,
it subjects itself to the application of judicial standards to its proceedings, particularly
the standard of "due process". The courts have been especially zealous in the pro-
' For some late discussions of the problem see 18 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 421-685 (1951)
(symposium on Congressional investigations); Dodd, Self-Incrimination by Witnesses before
Congressional Committees, 11 F. R. D. 245 (1951); 64 Harv. L. Rev. 987 (1951).
2 That this is in effect no limitation at all see infra.
3 See O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U. S. 516 (1933).
4 Article I, Section 5, Cl. 2.
5 Barsky v. United States, 167 F. 2d 241, 250 (D. C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied 334 U. S.
843 (1948).
6 U. S. CONST., AMEND. IX.
7 Ibid., AMEND. I to X.
8 "Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the authority of either
House of Congress, to give testimony or to produce papers upon any matter under inquiry
before either House, or any committee of either House of Congress, willfully makes default,
or who having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdeameanor, punishable by a fine of not more than $1000
nor less than $100, and imprisonment in a common jail for not less than one month nor
more than twelve months."
9 See Marsball v. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521 (1917).
tection of the citizen's rights where he appears before quasi-judicial bodies such
as administrative agencies'0 and grand-juries." There is no good reason why the
citizen should not be equally protected in the case of Congressional investigations.
Even where Congress has acted pursuant to its inherent contempt power and sum-
marily cited and punished witnesses, the federal courts have consistently enter-
tained writs of habeas corpus to insure that the actions of the Congress were properly
taken.' 2 Where the implied grant of power is exceeded, the court has the power to
order release of a person confined by the Sergeant-at-Arms of either House.
In the course of Congressional hearings there is often a clash between the
committee in its desire to obtain information, and the witness who claims that
he is entitled, as a matter of right, to withhold certain information. The rights
asserted are generally the folowing:
A. Privilege against self-incrimination--While many witnesses before Con-
gressional committees may lose their right not to incriminate themselves by failing
to claim it properly' 3 or seasonably,14 current practice in the Congress and in the
federal courts indicates a liberal disposition to allow any witness who makes a
patently bona lide claim of the privilege, to refuse to testify without fear of being
prosecuted under the contempt statute.15 Only where it is obvious that the claim of
privilege is a device for deliberate obstruction of the committee does prosecution
generally follow.16
Since the decision in Counselman v. Hitchcock17 dissatisfaction has been ex-
pressed with the immunity statute which provides that "No testimony given by
a witness .... shall be used as evidence in any criminal proceeding against him in
any court, except in a prosecution for perjury committed in giving such testimony"
18 The Counselman case stated:
.... no statute which leaves the party or witness subject to prosecution after he
answers the criminating questions put to him, can have the effect of supplanting
the privilege conferred by the Constitution of the United States .... In view
of the constitutional provision, a statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford
absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offense to which the
question relates.
This sweeping dictum has been considerably limited by subsequent cases.19
To be within the protection of the statute, the testimony must be compelled, and
10 Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1 (1938).
11 Blau v. United States, 340 U. S. 159 (1950).
12 Jurney v. McCracken, 294 U. S. 125 (1935); Marshall v. Gordon, note 9 supra;
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892).
13 But cf. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U. S. 479 (1951).
14 Rogers v. United States, 340 U. S. 367 (1951); May v. United States, 175 F. 2d 994
(1949) cert. denied 338 U. S. 830 (1949).
15 Note 8 supra.
16 Cf. Eisler v. United States, 170 F. 2d 273 (D. C. Cir. 1948).
17 Note 12 supra.
18 18 U. S. Code §3486 (Supp. 1951).
19 E.g., United States v. Bryan, 339 U. S. 323 (1950), interpreted the statute to allow
such testimony to be used to establish a default under provision of 2 U. S. Code § 192 (1946),
note 8 supra. This same principle undoubtedly applies to using testimony to prove refusal to
answer questions under the same statute.
not voluntarily given without claim of privilege.20 It also appears that the im-
munity required under the holding of the Counselman case is only such immunity as
the sovereign is capable of giving. In spite of repeated attempt by members of
Congress to have general immunity legislation enacted, the Congress seems re-
luctant to authorize such broad immunity for witnesses before Congressional Com-
mittees, apparently being satisfied to obtain less information rather than provide
machinery which lends itself to abuse in providing immunity for criminals.
B. Right of privacy-this is a fundamental human right; a part of "life" and
"liberty" as set forth in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution and the Declaration
of Independence. It has been recognized in authoritative English legal writings
from the time of Blackstone.2 1 It has been labelled with many names such as the
"right to personal security", the "right to be left alone", and the "right not to be
unduly harrassed". Difficult as it is of exact definition, and as unaware as most persons
are when others are being denied it, most of us are quick to recognize it as our
"birthright", "God-given right", or "natural right" when we ourselves are deprived of
it. It is necessary to distinguish the tort "right of privacy", which, although it springs
out of the same source, has developed into a distinct concept circumscribed by rules,
decisions, and statutes. The basic human right of privacy with which we are con-
cerned is a much broader and more inclusive concept. It operates as a general
limitation on government rather than as a norm for personal interrelationships
(the tort concept). Since it is a fundamental right, legislators, administrators, and
courts are powerless to legally qualify it; its denial is a violation of the rights
guaranteed by the Constitution. Like "freedom of speech", its exercise can be
limited only when there is an overriding public interest to be served,22 and then only
to that extent which is absolutely necessary to serve that purpose and no more.
C. Property right in reputation---The tort law of libel and slander is founded
on this right.23 However, the person defamed during the course of a Congressional
investigation has no remedy, because legislative immunity24 operates as an absolute
protection from civil suit for the legislator, no matter how irresponsible or scur-
rilious his remarks. 25 Defamation during the course of a Congressional investigation
lends itself to many novel forms. Among the more vicious devices available to the
examiner is character assassination by association. Most commonly this takes the
form of linking a person to an unsavory cause or occurrence by showing that his
friends or associates were connected or reputed to have been connected with it.
Another, more subtle approach, might be to sandwich a witness in with a group of
20 May v. United States, note 14 supra.
21 COMMENTARIES, Book I, Chapter 1.
22 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919), wherein the principle of "clear and
present danger" as a restriction on the right to exercise free speech originated.
23 Throckmorton's Cooley on Torts (1930), p. 316.
24 U. S. CONST., Article I, Section 6.
25 Cochrane v. Couzens, 42 F. 2d 783 (D. C. Cir. 1930). But cf. Tenney v. Brandhove,
341 U. S. 367 (1951), this case should serve to put legislators on notice that there may
come a case where the abuse of the privilege is so flagrant and the motivation of the legis-
lator so base, that his actions, even though ostensibly for a legislative purpose, will be re-
garded by the courts as without the legislative process. Under such a holding the legislator
woud be liable civilly for an unprincipled attack on the reputation of another.
other witnesses of notorious reputation (e.g., known criminals, gangsters, or com-
munists) to make it appear that he is one of the same class of persons. The fact
that these hearings are governed by no established rules of evidence, also makes it
possible for the examiner to phrase questions in such a manner that they are in effect
accusations of malfeasance. The ordinary witness cannot satisfactorily answer most
of these questions in a manner calculated to clear him of the implied innuendoes
and resulting stigma of guilt. Since he is denied the right to call witnesses in his
own behalf, or even the right to be cross-examined by his own attorney, the witness
must do the best he can to reduce the damage to his reputation by "self-serving"
statements to the committee or the press, neither of which are likely to be very
effective in the eyes of the committee or the public vis-a-vis the accusations.
Another hazard to the witness' reputation in these hearings is Title 2, U. S.
Code § 193 (1946) which provides;
No witness is privileged to refuse to testify to any fact, or to produce any
paper .... upon the ground that his testimony to such fact or his production
of such paper may tend to disgrace him or otherwise render him infamous.
Does this mean that, where pertinent to the subject matter being investigated,
even the most sordid events in the witness' personal history must be revealed to
the world at large, or can the information properly be restricted to those who need to
know-the legislators? May a witness who desires to give his information, but
exclusively to the legislators, require that they respect his confidence where disclosure
would serve no public purpose?
This leads to the inquiry as to what are the legitimate functions of the Con-
gressional investigating committee. The federal courts have recognized only one
function of a House or Senate investigation as being within the Constitutional
delegation of powers-to gather information for the purpose of legislating.2 6
"[N]either of these bodies possesses the general power of making inquiry into
the private affairs of the citizen."27 The requirement that the citizen divulge his
private affairs to the Congress is qualified by two prerequisites, (1) the questions
asked of him must be pertinent to the subject matter of the inquiry,28 and (2) the
subject matter of the inquiry must be confined in scope to a field within which the
Congress is competent to legislate.29 As thus set forth the limitations seem clear
and easily applicable to restrain Congress within a proper sphere. However, two
recent developments in Constitutional Law operate to confuse the picture. Most im-
portant is the gradual extension of the sovereignty of the federal government
through the enlargement of its commerce power, war power, and taxing power.
The federal "limited" sovereignty has for all practical purposes swallowed up the
"residual" sovereignty of the states.30 It is not surprising that the courts find great
difficulty in detecting areas of legislation which are now outside the competence of
2 6 McGrain v. Daugherty, 173 U. S. 135 (1927).
27 Kilbourne v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 190 (1880).
28 Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263 (1929).
29 McGrain v. Daugherty, note 26 supra, at 176.
30 Even the last vestiges of state sovereignty, the police power in the fields of public
health, safety and morals, are not immune to the "grants in aid program".
Congress. In addition, the courts have evolved the concept of "presumption of
regularity" 3' or "proper purpose"32 in questions asked by Congressional investigators
to limit the traditional standard which is still applied to administrative agency
investigations:
An official inquisition to compel disclosures of fact is not an end, but a means to
an end; and it is a mere truism to say that the end must be a legitimate one to
justify the means. The citizen when interrogated about his private affairs, has a
right before answering, to know why the inquiry is made; and if the purpose
disclosed is not a legitimate one, he may not be compelled to answer.
3 3
No witness under the new standard need ever be apprised in what regard
the demanded information is deemed pertinent by the investigators. The witness
refuses to answer at his peril, even though he sincerely believes that his answer
could not possibly be relevant to the inquiry. Add to this the broad field of in-
quiry set forth in some recent Congressional resolutions empowering investiga-
tions3 4 and it becomes clear that virtually no question or line of questioning is
denied to the committee.
While no court has as yet decided that one of the legitimate purposes for which
a Congressional investigation might be held is to inform the public, a few eminent
legal scholars have suggested that this is an important purpose and within the
Constitutional grant of power to the Congress. 3 Undoubtedly, a democracy thrives
best where the public is well informed; but informing the public and entertaining
the public are two different things. In every case where it appears that extraordinary
publication of the proceedings would serve to convey some valuable information to
the public, the public interest must be balanced against the witness' individual rights.
Except in rare instances, it is doubtful that extraordinary publication (e.g., television
and radio broadcasting) of committee proceedings involving the exposure of private
affairs accomplishes any valuable informative function, although, in the light of
public reaction to the Kefauver Committee telecasts, its entertainment value cannot
be doubted. Ordinarily the informative function can best be served by publication of
the findings of the committee at the conclusion of its hearings.
It is an unfortunate truism that the public at large is always anxious to see
a good show even at the expense of the individual liberty of the person providing
the show. The public is notoriously insensitive to the rights of others in such cir-
cumstances. The circulation of even "high-class" publications bears a surprising
correlation to the amount of sensational, sordid and lewd material which appears.
31 Sinclair v. United States, note 28 supra, at 296.
32 Eisler v. United States, note 16 supra; Morford v. United States, 176 F. 2d 241, 258
(D. C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied 339 U. S. 258 (1950); Barsky v. United States, note 5 supra;
cf. Tenney v. Brandhove, note 25 supra.
33 Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 298 U. S. 1, 25 (1935).
34 E.g., the resolution setting up the Dies Committee gave it power to investigate "(1)
the extent, character and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States,
(2) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda
that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle
of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (3) all other questions
in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation." House Res.
282, 75th Cong., 3rd sess., (1938). (Italics supplied).35 E.g., see Woodrow Wilson, CONGRESSIONAL GOvERNMENT (15th Ed., 1900), p. 303.
Uncolored facts have little commercial value. It would be indeed unfortunate for
individual rights if the Congressional power of inquisition should ever be measured
by standards of popular appeal or "newsworthiness".
Only in exceptional cases should the Congressional committee-be allowed to
expose private affairs to unlimited publicity, for, although a public show might
incidentally perform the legitimate functions of obtaining information for legisla-
tion and informing the public, the danger exists that the primary purpose of such
investigations will degenerate, in the absence of external limitations, into one of the
following:
1. Obtaining free publicity for the committee members.
36
2. A political weapon for the character assassination of adversaries.
3. A means of punishing the reluctant or contumacious witness.
4. An extra-judicial form of punishment for criminals who are immune from
criminal prosecution.37
5. To disclose weaknesses in local laws or law enforcement.
6. To obtain information for criminal prosecution of the witness or others.3 8
7. To indoctrinate or propagandize the voter as to the desirability of a proposed
cause of action.
The possibility that excessive publicity will foster these abuses at the expense
of individual rights, and without any compensating profit to the Congress or the
public, indicates that ordinarily such committees should be required to conform
to the traditional procedure and decorum of the parent body.3
9
And whether these forms be in all cases the most rational or not is really not
of so great importance. It is much more material that there should be a rule to
go by than what that rule is; that there may be a uniformity of proceeding in
business not subject to the caprice of the Speaker or captiousness of the mem-
bers. It is very material that order decency and regularity be preserved in a
dignified public body.
40
Exceptions should be clearly defined and their status as exceptions to the
normal manner of proceeding in Congressional investigations definitely established.
Two tests suggest themselves for defining these exceptions: (1) the activities or
persons exposed must be of such a nature that their existence threatens the survival
of the nation or its institutions, and (2) the danger must be substantial and
reasonably imminent. Application of these tests would permit unlimited publicity
for investigations into subversive activities and possibly, large scale organized
36 It has been suggested that the chairmanship of a sensational inquiry is a political
plum waiting to be plucked by the astute politician, or available to be offered to the party
wheelhorse who needs a boost in prestige to insure his reelection.
37 This raises the interesting question whether a resolution empowering a committee
to sit for such a purpose is not in effect a Bill of Attainder.
38 Such a purpose usurps the grand-jury function.
39 "The rules of the House are here by made the rules of its standing committee so far
as applicable, except that a motion to recess from day to day is hereby made a motion of
high privilege in said committees." Rule XII (f), Rules of the House of Representatives.
40 Jefferson's Manual, Section 1.
crime, but would insure that where there is no overwhelming public interest to be
served, the rights of the individual would be protected.
There are certain other limitations which may properly be applied to Con-
gressional committee activities by the courts. These are in the nature of requirements
imposed by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution upon the exercise of govern-
mental functions by the Federal Government. A perfunctory appraisal of recent de-
cisions in the federal courts might incline one to the view that the only tangible
right which a witness possesses at these hearings is his privilege against self-
incrimination. This is an obvious oversimplification.41 No one would seriously con-
tend that the powers of the committee are plenary in all other regards. As an
extreme example, the courts would no more condone the use of "third-degree"
methods by a committee to obtain information for legislation than by the police for
criminal prosecution.42
The executive branch of the government is required to accord procedural
due process to witnesses when it exercises quasi-judicial functions.43 The reasons
for requiring the same standard to be followed by Congressional committees
are equally strong and compelling. Conforming to due process merely requires
that the treatment of witnesses should be fair and just; it does not hinder the
committee in obtaining the information which it is entitled to have. However,
"fair play" and justice are not ephemeral illusions to be defined according to the
standard of each committeeman who may have an axe to grind, or even from the
relatively detached viewpoint of the committee-as-a-whole seeking to effectuate
the purposes of the empowering resolution. On the contrary, the courts, impartially
balancing the rights and duties of the individual against the public interest, are the
logical agency to set the standards of due process to be accorded to witnesses. This
can best be accomplished by the courts refusing to convict a witness under the
contempt statute44 where his contumacy consists of refusal to be a part of committee
proceedings obviously motivated by the primary purpose of doing violence to his
character.
The courts have stated categorically that no witness has the right to dictate
the conditions under which he will testify before a Congressional committee.45
Unfortunately, this dictum has developed out of cases where the objections of
the witness were patently a subterfuge for not testifying at all, or otherwise ob-
viously mala fide. Of course, no witness has a right to impose conditions of absolute
secrecy (unless national security demands it), or anonymity, or to demand protection
from every conceivable hazard to his reputation, liberty, life, or property. But,
every witness has a right to insist that the treatment accorded him be reasonably fair
and directed toward a proper end.
41 See Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power Investigation, 40
Harv. L. Rev. 153 (1926); and see 47 Col. L. Rev. 416 (1947).
42 Ashcroft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143 (1944).
43 Morgan v. United States, note 10 supra, at 22.
44 Note 8 supra.
45 Eisler v. United States, note 16 supra.
Where the only legitimate function of an inquiry is to obtain information
for legislating (as opposed to informing the public), the standard of the Eisler
case 46 seems too extreme. If the witness is willing to give the information desired,
but objects to the setting of the hearing (e.g., the presence of television, radio,
press, or a large audience) because it disturbs him, confuses his thoughts, or re-
strains him from testifying with ordinary candor, his reasonable requests should be
respected by the committee. By forcing him to testify in an objectionable atmosphere,
the committee defeats the very purpose of the investigation, and gives the witness
reason to complain that he is being denied due process of law.
The business of Congressional committees has been conducted in one of two
forms, the executive (or closed) session, and the public (or open) session. The
public and press are excluded from the executive session, and only so much of the
proceedings reported for public dissemination as the committee or the empowering
House of Congress deems appropriate. Although the initial justification for the
executive session was to preserve the secrecy of matters affecting national security,
more and more executive sessions are being utilized for the preliminary examination
of witnesses. Apparently the purpose here is to give the cooperative witness a
chance to aid the inquiry without being exposed to unwarranted publicity about
his private affairs. Also, it undoubtedly gives the committee more leeway in con-
ducting the inquiry without paralyzing formality necessary to properly impress
the public and press representatives. Much of the gathering of factual information
is done here.
On the other hand, there appears to be a growing tendency to use the public
session, especially where sordid matters and notorious persons are involved, as
a public show where the contumacious witness or the errant public official may be
exposed and harrassed by the committee. A recent innovation in committee pro-
ceedings is the introduction of television and radio broadcasting. The constitu-
tionality of the introduction of these media into the proceedings has been pre-
sumed by most authorities on the ground that it represents a mere extension of the
walls of the hearing room, or an expansion of press facilities already properly
present. From the standpoint of the right of Congress to prescribe the manner of its
proceedings47 this view is undoubtedly correct. No restraint can be imposed on the
Congress in this regard. The right of a committee to require, in every circumstance,
that every witness submit to having his testimony taken in the presence of these
media is not so clear.
It is submitted that in every case the test must be balancing the public interest
against individual rights. Unless a demonstrable need for informing the public in
this manner can be shown, the witness should, at his option, be allowed to choose
whether he will testify at executive or public session, as long as he is willing to give
that information which the committee has a right to demand.
HENRY J. CAPPELLO
46 Ibid.
47 Note 4 supra.
